WOMEN IN GOVERNMENT AS A PREDICTOR OF HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT:
AN ANALYSIS OF DESCRIPTIVE REPRESENTATION AND
SUBSTANTIVE OUTCOMES

CELINA ANTONELLIS*

ABSTRACT
This Comment explores the effects of women’s legislative
representation on their socio-economic development. 1 While the
literature has outlined the theoretical arguments for increasing
women’s legislative representation as a means of reducing gender
* University of Pennsylvania Law School, Class of 2021. I would like to thank all the
brilliant professors and classmates I’ve had throughout my academic career,
including those in the Political Science and English departments at Bucknell
University, as well as those at Penn Law. I would especially like to thank Professor
Douglas Hecock, who read and revised multiple, inferior iterations of this piece, as
well as Professor Serena Mayeri for her tremendously insightful feedback. Lastly, I
would like to thank the editors of the Journal of International Law for their great
work.
There are far more than two genders; however, for the purpose of clarity and
efficiency, this Comment will largely use the terms “men” and “women.” The usage
of these two terms does not presume to be an exhaustive list. This Comment will
also refer to “female” legislators. This term is intended to encompass any individual
who identifies as a woman, regardless of their gender assigned at birth. The fact
that there are so few legislators who openly identify as any gender other than male
or female only serves to demonstrate the lack of gender diversity present in elected
politics. Because there are so few openly nonbinary people, it is unclear whether
the data on female-identifying people would extrapolate to gender minorities. As
society grows to be more accepting of gender diversity, my hope as a nonbinary
person is that the makeup of our legislature will grow to reflect the large range of
genders.
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inequality, little work has been done to examine how these
arguments play out in practice. Therefore, this Comment explores
the theory behind women’s representation and provides case
studies to determine the exact nature of the link between
representation and development. While the literature claims that
women’s representation should promote women’s development,
statistical analyses have shown little support for that hypothesis. To
address this apparent gap, I examine two case studies: Chile and
Argentina. They reveal several confounding factors, including
women’s support within the executive and legislative branches, the
strength of women’s movements, the varying effects of legislative
gender quotas, and the impact of international law. All point to the
need for scholars and policymakers to focus on the barriers that
prevent women in government from enacting their policy
preferences and making meaningful change.
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INTRODUCTION

In the modern world, women are subordinate to men in nearly
every facet of life. From government to the labor force, education,
and healthcare, women tend to be chronically underrepresented and
undervalued. Consequently, there have been significant efforts
from a variety of sources to ameliorate this gender inequality. One
approach in the political arena is to improve women’s lives by
increasing the proportion of female representatives in government.
However, it remains unclear whether this approach has merit.
While one could infer that having more women in government
would produce a stronger voice for their female constituents, as well
as policies more responsive to their needs and aspirations (defined
here as “substantive representation”), it is not clear that this is the
case in practice or that this relationship extends beyond the policy
level. Accordingly, this Comment will attempt to determine if
countries with a higher proportion of women in their national
legislature (defined here as “descriptive representation”) do in fact
exhibit further socio-economic development for women (defined
here as “substantive outcomes”). 2 The questions driving this
investigation are as follows: Does women’s descriptive
representation bring about substantive outcomes? If so, how? If not,
why?
As the case studies of Chile and Argentina demonstrate, the
nature of the descriptive-substantive link is complex and non-linear;
several other confounding factors (e.g., women’s support within
executive and legislative branches, the strength of women’s
movements, legislative gender quotas, and international law) affect
whether women in the legislature can translate their presence into
socio-economic development.
As a preliminary matter, it is important to note the difficulty
inherent in defining what constitutes substantive representation or
substantive outcomes. While one might consider a particular policy
to be “female-friendly,” others may disagree. The same is true of
certain measures of socio-economic development. For example, the
UN has attempted to measure women’s development by creating
2
See HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 89 (1967)
(describing descriptive representation and explaining its limitations). But see
generally, MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE
CAPABILITIES APPROACH 5 (2000) (arguing for a “capabilities approach” to
international human development, which focuses on “what people are actually able
to do and to be,” rather than outcomes).
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the Gender Development Index (GDI)—an aggregate variable that
compares women’s life expectancy, expected years of schooling,
mean years of schooling, and GNI per capita to that of men.
Similarly, the Gender Inequality Index (GII) aggregates several
measures including maternal mortality ratios, adolescent birth rates,
the female population with at least a secondary education, the
proportion of women in government, and labor force participation. 3
However, these measures contain normative judgments as to what
is, and is not, good for women—a determination that varies across
countries and cultures. Despite this lack of consensus, this
Comment proceeds under the assumption that there is one universal
and objective definition of what constitutes improvement in
women’s lives, while bearing in mind the presumptions that are
made (often on the basis of Western, democratic ideals) when certain
policies or outcomes are deemed female-friendly.
It is also important to note the relationship between substantive
outcomes and gender equality. Though one can imagine a country
where men and women are relatively equal in terms of substantive
outcomes (e.g., life expectancy, education rates, etc.), such outcomes
may be relatively low as compared to other countries or global
averages. Likewise, men and women of a certain country may be
vastly unequal in terms of substantive outcomes, yet relatively high
as compared to other countries or global averages. Despite these
complexities, this Comment proceeds under that assumption that
gender equality and improvements in women’s substantive
outcomes are both worthwhile—and virtually similar—ends.
Ultimately, the data shows that there is far more to
representation than sheer numbers; having women present in
national legislatures does matter, but they must overcome numerous
obstacles for their election to translate into outcomes. Therefore, this
Comment is intended to promote a new discussion around
legislative dynamics and what constitutes good and fair
representation, as well as how to ensure that female representatives
are able to legislate freely. Consequently, the implications of this
Comment go beyond gender politics and into the realm of racial,
sexual orientation, and other identity politics.
This Comment proceeds in four Parts: Part II discusses the
theory behind women’s representation in government by exploring
qualitative questions about gender quotas, political parties, and the
3
U.N. Development Programme, 2020 Human Development Report
Technical Notes, at 1 (2020).
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specific dynamics of national gender politics, as well quantitative
analyses of the descriptive-substantive link; Part III uses the cases of
Chile and Argentina to examine the relationship between women in
the legislature and women’s development and isolate the factors
that impact this relationship; and Part IV briefly concludes, offering
limitations and suggestions for further research.
II. THE THEORETICAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WOMEN IN
GOVERNMENT AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
It may seem axiomatic that when more women are present in the
political arena, more female-friendly policies will be enacted into
law, and as a result, women will enjoy better substantive outcomes
in terms of a greater presence in politics and the workforce,
improved access to education and healthcare, and overall increases
in well-being. This causal relationship presumes that female
legislators do, in fact, promote the passage of female-friendly
policies and that female-friendly policies, when and if they are
successfully implemented, bring about a higher level of socioeconomic development for women. At the very least, increasing
women’s representation is “[a] shot in the dark: far more likely to
reach its target than when those shooting are predominantly male.”4
If this is true, then increasing women’s representation in
government can be considered a viable solution to at least some
forms of gender inequality.
It is possible, however, that descriptive representation does not
translate into substantive outcomes. While it would appear that
having more women in government does produce a stronger voice
for female constituents as well as more responsive policies, it is not
clear that this necessarily leads to further socio-economic
development for women. The benefits of having a greater level of
descriptive representation may be limited to the political arena.
Policies may be misguided or poorly implemented, or they may fail
to produce tangible improvements in women’s lives.
The
relationship between women’s descriptive representation and
substantive outcomes—in terms of social, economic, and political
development—must be studied to determine if increasing the
presence of women in government can effectively address gender
inequalities throughout society.
4

ANNE PHILLIPS, THE POLITICS OF PRESENCE 83 (1995).
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a. Qualitative Literature Review of the Theoretical Relationship
To determine whether having more women in a national
legislature will produce better outcomes for women, one must first
examine the arguments both for and against this proposed
relationship.
“Difference-blind” representation—that is,
representation which disregards the representative’s affiliation with
a certain social group—is the global norm; representation based on
identity—that is, group-based representation—is therefore subject
to debate.5
i.

Arguments in Favor of Women’s Descriptive Representation

There are four primary arguments in favor of increasing
women’s legislative representation as a means of producing better
substantive outcomes for women. First, equal representation
implies that women’s rights are as important as men’s and creates a
sense of social justice. Second, women in politics act as role models,
creating a cycle of empowerment that continues into the future.
Third, including women further guarantees that their particular
needs, interests, and concerns—which emerge from their shared
female experience—will not be overlooked by a male-dominated
legislature. Finally, women act as unique politicians, bringing
certain behaviors and values to politics that may otherwise be absent
and thereby adding to the diversity of the legislature.6
Lani Guinier takes issue with what she sees as a harmfully
powerful majority and uses this as the basis for her theoretical plea
for increased female representation. The emphasis in the U.S. and
other Western democracies on equal political opportunity has
produced a “tyranny of the majority” that marginalizes the voices of
5
MELISSA S. WILLIAMS, VOICE, TRUST, AND MEMORY:
AND THE FAILINGS OF LIBERAL REPRESENTATION 4 (1998).

MARGINALIZED GROUPS

6
PHILLIPS, supra note 4, at 62-75; Joya Misra, Women, Politics, and Gender
Inequality, 42 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 397, 407 (2020); see also Nancy Millar, Envisioning
a U.S. Government That Isn’t 84% Male: What the United States Can Learn from Sweden,
Rwanda, Burundi, and Other Nations, 62 U. MIAMI L. REV. 129, 130 (2007) (“Regardless
of whether political representation leads to women’s improved status or women’s
improved status leads to increased representation, the result is the same: Women
(both politicians and voters) benefit from this symbiosis, and the level of women’s
political representation serves as an indicator of women’s status in society
generally.”).
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minorities.7 In U.S. society, there is an underlying belief that hard
work guarantees personal advancement. 8 The result is policy that
allows minorities to vote, but which structurally prevents them from
holding office or benefitting from substantive outcomes. 9 In this
way, formal representation via the “one person, one vote” mindset
proves insufficient. 10 The basis for fairness and equality is not
simply being allowed to vote, but having the opportunity to choose
one’s representatives and share in the substantive political outcomes
they produce.11 Fairness must be measured at the substantive level;
equality spans all the way from the vote to the representative, to
legislation, and finally, to outcomes.12
Fairness aside, others question whether men can act as authentic
representatives of women. While this may not seem problematic in
principle, it fails in practice.13 Male-dominated legislatures tend to
produce gender-neutral policies,14 which perpetuate the patriarchy
that leaves women in a position of inferiority relative to their male
counterparts. Moreover, male legislators are significantly less likely
to fight for women’s interests.15 There must be women present in the
legislature to produce substantive outcomes for women. 16 This is
because women have a significantly different set of constituents,
attitudes, policy priorities, issues, voting patterns, bill sponsorships,
7
LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN
REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 12 (1994). Note that here the term minority is used to
mean any group that is not traditionally thought of as being socially, economically,
or politically powerful. A minority is not necessary a numerical minority, but
rather, a group whose power—social, economic, or political—is not proportional to
the size of that group. Therefore, women constitute a minority in this sense. Id.
8
Id. at 24.
9 See id. at 24-25 (explaining the contradictions involving legislation to ensure
that protected racial and linguistic minorities enjoy the right to vote, enacted during
the Reagan Administration, and the Reagan Administration’s choice to protect
incumbent, white elected officials regardless of the interests of Black voters).
10 Id. at 32–34.
11 Id. at 40.
12 See id. at 40, 70 (arguing that, in the case of Black voters, political fairness
means “a fair opportunity to choose their representatives . . . and a fair share of
substantive, legislative policy outcomes,” and that “fair system[s] of political
representation would provide mechanisms to ensure that disadvantaged and
stigmatized minority groups also have a fair chance to have their policy preferences
satisfied”).
13
PAMELA PAXTON & MELANIE M. HUGHES, WOMEN, POLITICS, AND POWER: A
GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 4 (2d ed. 2014).
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 11.
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and legislative styles from male legislators.17 Using data collected
from the U.S. Congress, Pamela Paxton and Melanie M. Hughes find
that female legislators are more likely than men to claim women as
a specific constituency. 18 Additionally, they are more likely to
prioritize, introduce, and sponsor bills that are directly related to
women’s interests. 19 Consequently, men and women in Congress
agree that having more women present changes the way the
legislature works.20
Even if women do not act differently from their male
counterparts in the legislature, they still deserve equal
representation based upon principles of equity and justice.21 In the
U.S., women deserve 50% of the representation—descriptive and
substantive—on account of making up roughly 50% of the
population.22 Regardless of arguments against what Anne Phillips
calls a “politics of presence” (i.e., based on the presence of diverse
groups), she, too, claims that a greater emphasis on group-based
representation is necessary to create a fairer political system, and, as
a result, a fairer society.23 Beyond fairness, a legislative body that is
representative of the population as a whole will be viewed by
society—and especially by historically marginalized groups—as
more legitimate in the decisions and policies it produces.24

Id. at 199.
Id. at 199–200.
19 Id. at 206.
20 Id. at 214. It remains difficult to determine, however, if this is a result of
partisanship or gender. See Patrick E. Shea & Charlotte Christian, The Impact of
Women Legislators on Humanitarian Military Interventions, 61 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 2043,
2048 (2017). Moreover, the relationship may not be linear. A critical mass of women
may be necessary to produce substantive results, although evidence for this theory
is mixed. See id. at 2051-52; Misra, supra note 6, at 407; PAXTON & HUGHES, supra note
13, at 216-18.
21
PAXTON & HUGHES, supra note 13, at 198.
22 Id. at 9. Some have even made the argument that the Equal Protection
Clause of the U.S. Constitution guarantees a right to descriptive representation. See,
e.g., Stacy Hawkins, Diversity, Democracy & Pluralism: Confronting the Reality of Our
Inequality, 66 MERCER L. REV. 577, 579 (2015).
23
PHILLIPS, supra note 4, at 25.
24
Sveinung Arnesen & Yvette Peters, The Legitimacy of Representation: How
Descriptive, Formal, and Responsiveness Representation Affect the Acceptability of
Political Decisions, 51 COMPAR. POL. STUD. 868, 869, 879-81, 884, 888-889 (2017).
17

18
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Arguments Opposed to Women’s Descriptive Representation

Several arguments exist that push back on the notion that
increasing the representation of a particular group will inherently
benefit members of that group. Critics point to four main problems
with arguments for group-based descriptive representation. First,
essentialism—the belief that all members of a group share the same
interests. Second, group proliferation—the belief that allowing one
group fair representation necessitates doing so for all groups. Third,
legislative marginalization—the belief that legislative presence will
automatically translate into policy. Finally, accountability—the
belief that just because a representative is from a group, they will
accurately represent that group.25
Not every member of a certain group will share the same beliefs
on every topic. 26 No one woman can speak for all women, as
women’s interests can be as varied as the women themselves. 27
Nonetheless, identity is important to political ideology, at least to
the extent it provides a shared social perspective. 28 It is not that
women have a unified, collective interest so much as they have
distinct interests unique from men.29 This shared experience often
translates into policy preferences. 30 Even in a legislature where
representatives are given considerable autonomy, their identities
and experiences underlie their personal politics.31
What then qualifies a group as deserving greater legislative
presence and how can this be balanced against the risk of excessive
group proliferation?
A group must first be marginalized.
Furthermore, membership within the group must be involuntary,
immutable, and dichotomous; that is, members do not choose it,
cannot leave it, and experience the world differently because of it. 32
In the case of gender, women have a unique perspective that is
inherently different from a male perspective, due to their different
WILLIAMS, supra note 5, at 5-7; PHILLIPS, supra note 4, at 21-24.
PHILLIPS, supra note 4, at 55.
27 Misra, supra note 6, at 410-11.
28
PHILLIPS, supra note 4, at 53.
29 Id. at 68.
30
Shea & Christian, supra note 20, at 2048.
31
See PHILLIPS, supra note 4, at 53. This relationship is made even more
complex in the case of multiple, intersecting identities, as factors such as race, class,
and religion may be more salient to one’s political behavior than gender.
32
WILLIAMS, supra note 5, at 116.
25
26
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social upbringing. Having a shared history of marginalization
creates a collective memory among women and builds negative
images and stereotypes into everyday society. 33 The result is that
women are connected by past inequality and share a certain
perspective because of it. 34 Consequently, women’s political
equality requires self-representation within the legislature.35
Descriptive representation is useless, however, unless privileged
groups are open to the perspectives of marginalized groups. 36
Merely electing a candidate, no matter how accountable and
authentic, is not guaranteed to produce substantive outcomes as
microaggressions and biases within the legislature may prevent
minority representatives from being effective. 37 Furthermore,
structural barriers may prevent female legislators from producing
substantive change. Even if a female representative is willing and
able to devote special attention to the interests of her female
constituents, political institutions may prevent her from doing so.
The “masculine model” of norms, rules, and standards (often
discriminatory towards women), combined with the lack of party
support for female candidates (as selection tends to favor male
attributes) creates an institutional bias against women as
legislators.38 Furthermore, “institutions may change women before
women can change institutions.”39 Because national legislatures are
almost universally male-dominated, traditionally male behavior is
considered the norm.40 Women in politics are consequently forced
to adopt the behaviors of their male counterparts to fit more neatly
into the current system.41
Id. at 183.
Id. at 188.
35 Id. at 137.
36 Id. at 221.
37
GUINIER, supra note 7, at 63.
38 See Nadezhda Shvedova, Obstacles to Women’s Participation in Parliament, in
WOMEN IN PARLIAMENT: BEYOND NUMBERS 33, 35-38 (Julie Ballington & Azza Karam
eds., rev. ed. 2005) (describing these obstacles in greater detail).
39
PAXTON & HUGHES, supra note 13, at 14.
40 See id. at 210 (discussing how male-gendered institutions reward qualities
typically associated with males and how a “male legislating style” has
predominated during the course of history).
41
This phenomenon can be seen in the case of the Brazilian national
legislature, where, despite the fact that men and women have distinctly different
33
34
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Furthermore, male legislators may actively seek to undermine
their female counterparts for fear of losing political power.42 Crucial
to the effectiveness of any legislator is the support they receive from
their colleagues. Bills sponsored by female legislators face more
scrutiny and have lower passage rates than male-sponsored bills, as
male legislators are less supportive of, and at times, verbally
aggressive toward their female counterparts. 43 Representation is a
zero-sum game; dramatically increasing the representation of
women in the legislature can cause backlash from male legislators,
thereby producing negative consequences for female-friendly
policy. 44 Without male support, it can be almost impossible for
women to act as effective legislators.
Related to this legislative marginalization is a lack of support
within civil society. “[W]omen’s movements outside of formal
government are an important piece of the puzzle,” given their ability
to put pressure on policymakers. 45 Globally, mobilization around
reducing gender inequality has proven to have a tremendous effect
on increasing descriptive representation. 46 Furthermore, the
leadership styles, they do not differ significantly in their legislative approaches.
Kendall D. Funk, Gendered Governing? Women’s Leadership Styles and Participatory
Institutions in Brazil, 68 POL. RSCH. Q. 564, 565, 570-71 (2015). Presumably, this is
because the female legislators have assimilated into a traditionally male institution,
which explains the lack of empirical support for the notion that women act
fundamentally different from men. See id. at 570-71 (stating that one explanation for
this result could be that women feel obligated to convey masculine traits because
society typically expects leaders to have those traits); Misra, supra note 5, at 410
(stating that approaches that emphasize women and men as being guided by
separate instincts enjoy less empirical support than approaches that embrace a more
nuanced perspective).
42
PAXTON & HUGHES, supra note 13, at 210.
43
Pamela Paxton et al., Gender in Politics, 33 ANN. REV. SOCIO. 263, 274 (2007);
see also Funk, supra note 39, at 565 (citing one study that found men can become
more verbally aggressive as the proportion of women in a group increases).
44
Karen Beckwith & Kimberly Cowell-Meyers, Sheer Numbers: Critical
Representation Thresholds and Women’s Political Representation, 5 PERSPS. ON POL. 553,
554 (2007); Ester Del Campo, Women and Politics in Latin America: Perspectives and
Limits of the Institutional Aspects of Women’s Political Representation, 83 SOC. FORCES
1697, 1702 (2005) (describing how men feel threatened by inclusion of women into
already scarce leadership or representation positions).
45
Misra, supra note 6, at 411.
46
Yvonne Galligan, Bringing Women in: Global Strategies for Gender Parity in
Political Representation, 6 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 319, 333-35
(2006). Cf. Irene Tinker, Assumptions and Realities: Electoral Quotas for Women, 10 GEO.
J. INT’L AFFS. 7, 8 (2009) (citing a study concluding that the most important catalyst
for women’s increased participation is the operation of women’s organizations in
an open and receptive political system).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol43/iss4/4

2022]

Women in Government as a Predictor

1049

presence of an active feminist movement, the absence of a
countermovement, and a positive public opinion around women’s
issues all tend toward women’s substantive representation.47 When
descriptive representation is combined with a female-friendly
environment, both within the legislature and within civil society,
substantive outcomes are more likely.48
Even if the perspectives of marginalized groups are welcomed
in the legislature, they must be authentic to merit their inclusion. A
shared group identity is not necessarily enough to ensure effective
representation. To guarantee substantive representation, there must
be accountability.49 Although one may assume a representative will
advocate for their identity group, politicians may pursue their
personal or party preferences instead.50 Furthermore, women may
simply not have the desire to act for their female constituents. 51
Focusing exclusively on descriptive representation overlooks the
fact that representatives may choose to act contrary to the interest of
their identity group.52
Beyond marginalization or accountability issues within a
legislature, the legislature itself may be structurally unable to
produce effective policy. Transforming descriptive representation
into substantive representation can pose an “unrealistically high
standard.” 53 Male or female, passing legislation can be
tremendously difficult, let alone translating such legislation into
meaningful outcomes. Despite the belief that a legislature can create
policy that will affect civil society, a nation’s legislative branch may
be too weak or ineffective to fulfill this role. In some countries, the
executive branch holds the power to set policy and implement it
47 See Galligan, supra note 46, at 333-34 (highlighting the connection between
organized feminism and movements to increase women’s political representation).
48
Beckwith & Cowell-Meyers, supra note 44, at 558 tbl.2.
49
WILLIAMS, supra note 5, at 230.
50
PAXTON & HUGHES, supra note 13, at 12; see also Donald P. Haider-Markel,
Representation and Backlash: The Positive and Negative Influence of Descriptive
Representation, 32 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 107, 111 (2007) (describing how context, individual
preferences, and individual characteristic constrain an official’s policymaking).
51
For example, former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher proved to be
particularly disinterested in representing her female constituency. PAXTON &
HUGHES, supra note 13, at 14.
52
See Erin Tolley, Do Women “Do Better” in Municipal Politics? Electoral
Representation Across Three Levels of Government, 44 CAN. J. POL. SCI. 573, 581 (2011)
(discussing criticisms of the ‘mirror or descriptive representation’ view).
53
Susan Franceschet & Jennifer M. Piscopo, Gender Quotas and Women’s
Substantive Representation: Lessons from Argentina, 4 POL. & GENDER 393, 400 (2008).
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effectively. 54 In these countries, substantive change results from
centralized, top-down legal reform. 55 Ultimately then, the
institutional power that the legislature has relative to other
government branches affects women’s presence and power within
the legislature itself.56
b. Quantitative Literature Review of the Theoretical Relationship
Despite the theoretical arguments for and against descriptive
representation, the question remains as to what actually happens
when more women are present in a legislative body. The link
between descriptive and substantive representation is complex and
non-linear; there are several factors that affect one or both forms of
representation, making it difficult to isolate any correlation between
the two. Consequently, quantitative research on the effects of
increasing women’s representation in government has not gone
beyond the policy level. Little research has been done on the effects
that increasing women’s descriptive representation has on
substantive outcomes. This Comment examines this gap in the
literature.57
54
See Shan-Jan Sarah Liu & Lee Ann Banaszak, Do Government Positions Held
by Women Matter? A Cross-National Examination of Female Ministers’ Impacts on
Women’s Political Participation, 13 POL. & GENDER 132, 138-39 (2017) (discussing how
cabinet members have the ability to determine how regulations are implemented
and initiate legislation, while legislators are more constrained with respect to these
functions). One should not ignore the power that the judicial branch holds, as well,
especially in common law jurisdictions. To truly guarantee women’s substantive
representation, attention must be given not only to the legislature, but also to the
executive and the judiciary. Carolyn A. Dubay, Beyond Critical Mass: A Comparative
Perspective on Judicial Design and Gender Equality in Iraq and Afghanistan, 24 FLA. J.
INT’L L. 163, 166-68, 170 (2012) (emphasizing a “holistic strategy” that incorporates
women’s perspectives into the judiciary, in addition to the legislature).
55
Galligan, supra note 46, at 321.
56
Leslie Schwindt-Bayer & Peverill Squire, Legislative Power and Women’s
Representation, 10 POL. & GENDER 622, 623 (2014).
57
One reason for the lack of quantitative studies that go beyond the policy
level is the difficulty associated with the statistical analysis. Defining substantive
outcomes is an inherently imperfect exercise. Not all outcomes can be included, let
alone measured and reported. Even aggregate indices, such as the GDI and GII,
leave out certain measures. Moreover, any definition of substantive outcomes will
be fraught with normative judgments and influenced by social, political, and
cultural ideals. Once such a definition exists, correlating it with the proportion of
women in a country’s national legislature can be daunting. To prove that women
in government are, in fact, bringing about improvement in the lives of women
requires careful consideration of control variables and local circumstances.
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Prior Statistical Analyses

In her 2007 study of the German national government, Christina
V. Xydias measured the relationship between descriptive
representation and the number of times women were mentioned in
the legislative process. 58 Ultimately, Xydias found that female
legislators advocated on behalf of their female constituents’ interests
to a greater extent than their male counterparts.59 Yet Xydias does
not discuss whether this advocacy translates into policy.
S.J. Kakuba’s 2015 study of the Ugandan Parliament presented
similar results.60 Specifically, Kakuba found that female Members of
Parliament were more likely to raise women’s issues (e.g., women’s
health, women’s education, sexual violence, and sexual harassment)
during parliamentary debate. 61 Kakuba assumes that these
mentions translate into female-friendly policies, but that assumption
is not explicitly proven.62
Accordingly, in their 2005 study, Leslie A. Schwindt-Bayer and
William Mishler measured the relationship between descriptive
representation and substantive policies. 63 Ultimately, they found
that descriptive representation had a significant effect on the policy
responsiveness of a given legislature, in terms of women’s issues;
female legislators did successfully implement female-friendly
policies.64 They claim that descriptive representation is, in fact, the
“keystone” of women’s representation, arguing that substantive
representation necessarily requires a greater proportion of women
in government—though descriptive representation alone may be
insufficient. 65 Yet Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler do not explore
58
Christina V. Xydias, Inviting More Women to the Party: Gender Quotas and
Women’s Substantive Representation in Germany, 37 INT’L J. SOCIO. 53, 53 (2007).
59 Id. at 64.
60
S. J. Kakuba, Women in the Parliament of Uganda (2001-2011): Issues and
Legislations to Improve the Status of Women, 5 INT’L J. ADVANCED LEGAL STUD. &
GOVERNANCE 20, 21 (2015).
61 Id. at 45.
62 Id. at 21-23, 45.
63
Leslie A. Schwindt-Bayer & William Mishler, An Integrated Model of Women’s
Representation, 67 J. POL. 407, 407 (2005). Note also that defining what constitutes
female-friendly policy is not a straightforward process. See Andrew Reynolds,
Women in the Legislatures and Executives of the World: Knocking at the Highest Glass
Ceiling, 51 WORLD POL. 547, 549-50 (1999).
64
Schwindt-Bayer & Mishler, supra note 63, at 419.
65 Id. at 422.
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whether descriptive representation leads to improvements in
women’s development.
Moving beyond policy responsiveness, Liam Swiss, Kathleen M.
Fallon, and Giovani Burgos used substantive outcomes—namely,
child health—as their dependent variable. 66 Theoretically, an
increase in women in the legislature should lead to a greater focus
on healthcare and social policy spending. 67 Consequently, they
studied the relationship between the proportion of women in
government and infant mortality to determine if there is a link
between descriptive representation and substantive outcomes.
They found that, when the proportion of women in government was
high (greater than 20%), child health indicators improved. 68 They
did not, however, determine if this relationship holds for other
substantive outcomes, particularly those that are of direct relevance
to women.
In my 2018 honors thesis, I attempted to fill the aforementioned
gap in the literature by measuring the relationship between
descriptive representation and fifteen different substantive
outcomes—including life expectancy, expected years of schooling,
maternal mortality rate, and labor force participation, among other
things. 69 Despite some weak relationships within certain country
groups and at certain time periods, there were very few substantive
outcomes that seemed to be singularly affected by an increased
proportion of women in the legislature.70 These results add to the
lack of evidence to support the hypothesis that descriptive
representation directly and positively affects substantive
outcomes.71
That said, the lack of statistical evidence does not rule out the
existence of a causal relationship; case studies are a necessary next
step in the investigation. To discover how women work through the
legislature, one must take an in-depth look at every case to
66
Liam Swiss et al., Does Critical Mass Matter? Women’s Political Representation
and Child Health in Developing Countries, 91 SOC. FORCES 531, 531 (2012). It is
important to note here the normative judgments inherent in defining child health
measures as indicative of women’s development.
67 Id. at 532.
68 Id. at 542.
69
Celina C. Antonellis, Women in Government as a Predictor of Human
Development: An Analysis of Descriptive and Substantive Representation 21, 24-25
(May 9, 2018) (B.A. thesis, Bucknell University) (on file with author).
70 Id. at 41.
71 Id.
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determine why female representatives are or are not producing
positive outcomes for their female constituency. It is for this reason
that this Comment turns, in Part III, to a case study of two countries,
Argentina and Chile.
ii.

Confounding Factors

Several confounding factors further blur the descriptivesubstantive link. Quotas, political parties, and gender ideology
often affect a female legislator’s tendency to represent women, as
well as the likelihood that their representation will translate into
substantive change.
Legislative gender quotas act as catalysts for women’s
descriptive representation, though they sometimes fail to achieve
their intended purpose.72 In fact, despite their massive popularity,
quotas may not even guarantee descriptive representation.73 Beyond
the effect quotas have on the proportion of women in a legislature,
however, they may also impact substantive representation by
increasing a female legislator’s likelihood to act for women—a
phenomenon known as the “mandate effect.”74 Conversely, quotas
may lead to backlash against female legislators, as their election may
be viewed as a result of their gender rather than their own merits.75
Of the different types of gender quotas, those that reserve seats in
the legislature, rather than those that reserve spots on electoral lists,
tend to be more problematic in that reserved seats are not viewed as
politically legitimate and the women holding those seats are viewed
72
See Paxton et al., supra note 41, at 269; Drude Dahlerup, Increasing Women’s
Political Representation: New Trends in Gender Quotas, in WOMEN IN PARLIAMENT:
BEYOND NUMBERS 141, 143-44 (Julie Ballington & Azza Karam eds., rev. ed. 2005)
(listing the pros and cons of legislative gender quotas); see also Bethany Conner, You
Made a Mistake – You Selected Women: The Implementation of Political Gender Quotas in
Postconflict African Nations, 17 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 203, 208 (2008) (discussing the
effect of the type of quota on its ability to increase descriptive representation, noting
that constitutional quotas tend to be the most successful); Tinker, supra note 44, at
8 (discussing the effect of political party leadership on candidate selection).
73
See Kathleen M. Fallon et al., Resolving the Democracy Paradox:
Democratization and Women’s Legislative Representation in Developing Nations, 1975 to
2009, 77 AM. SOCIO. REV. 380, 384 (2012) (“Despite increasing enthusiasm for gender
quotas in the world polity, scholars caution that quota implementation does not
guarantee greater political representation for women.”).
74
Franceschet & Piscopo, supra note 53, at 394.
75
Kathleen A. King, Representation of Women: Constitutional Legislative Quotas
in Rwanda and Uganda, 1 CHARLESTON L. REV. 217, 225, 227 (2007).

Published by Penn Carey Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,

1054

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

[Vol. 43:4

as tokens.76 When quota women are viewed as symbolic, rather than
legitimate and authentic representatives of women’s interests, they
lack power in the legislative process.77 Consequently, quotas may
have a neutral or even negative effect on substantive
representation.78
The presence of certain political parties can also affect women’s
descriptive and substantive representation. In particular, the
legislative presence of further left-leaning parties tends to promote
increased representation of women, as well as the implementation
of female-friendly legislation. 79 Relatedly, however, party loyalty
may diminish substantive representation, as female legislators feel
obligated to represent their party platform more than their female
constituency. Political parties are the “gatekeepers” to elected office
and hold tremendous power over candidate selection.80 Aside from
the fact that party leaders may not select female candidates in the
first place,81 when they do, they may demand strict adherence to
their platform, thereby restricting a female legislator’s ability to
authentically represent her female constituency.82 In fact, studies of
the U.S. Congress have shown that there is no significant difference
between the voting records of men and women within the
Republican and Democratic parties.83
Galligan, supra note 46, at 327-29.
Id. at 329; King, supra note 75, at 232, 235.
78
King, supra note 75, at 227, 234; Dubay, supra note 54, at 170, 176. While
quotas are treated here as a confounding factor in the relationship between
descriptive representation and substantive outcomes, it is important to note that
quotas, themselves, vary tremendously in their impact, depending upon factors
such as electoral systems, the type of quota, political and social culture, and
women’s movements. See Tinker, supra note 46, at 7.
79
Paxton et al., supra note 43, at 270 (observing that further left-leaning parties
are more likely to endorse egalitarian principles and support minority
representatives, including women); Beckwith & Cowell-Meyers, supra note 42, at
557 (recognizing that left-leaning parties tend to promote legislation favorable to
women’s interests more than right-leaning parties); Denise M. Walsh, Does the
Quality of Democracy Matter for Women’s Rights? Just Debate and Democratic Transition
in Chile and South Africa, 45 COMPAR. POL. STUD. 1323, 1326 (2012).
80
Galligan, supra note 46, at 330.
81
Shvedova, supra note 38, at 37
82
See Richard E. Matland, Increasing Women’s Political Participation: Legislative
Recruitment and Electoral Systems, in WOMEN IN PARLIAMENT: BEYOND NUMBERS 93,
94-97 (Julie Ballington & Azza Karam eds., rev. ed. 2005) (discussing the
gatekeeping function that party platforms play in choosing candidates); see also
King, supra note 75, at 226-27, 233 (discussing the effect of candidate selection on
accountability, power, and women’s substantive representation).
83
Misra, supra note 6, at 409.
76
77
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Perhaps the most important factor in determining the number of
women in a national legislature is gender ideology. 84 Cultural
norms—largely the result of geography and religion—have an even
greater effect on descriptive and substantive representation than
socio-economic factors.85 The relationship works simultaneously in
both directions, however; having more women in government may
alter gender stereotypes, thereby shifting cultural attitudes and,
ultimately, leading to more women in government.86 In particular,
the belief that men are more suited for politics simply because they
are more present in politics is challenged when more women are
present.87
Of course, the aforementioned factors do not have the same,
predictable effects in all cases. In particular, the forces that drive
women’s descriptive and substantive representation interact quite
differently in developed countries than they do in developing
countries. 88 This is due, in part, to the fact that developing
governments may not have the same political stability and strength
as developed governments have. 89 Development leads to the
breakdown of traditional (and often patriarchal) values, an increase
in women’s participation in education and in the workforce, and a
changed perspective of women’s role in society. As a result, women
become more politically active and descriptive representation
increases.90
Even when these confounding variables are appropriately
isolated and controlled for, the question remains whether there is a
relationship between women’s descriptive and substantive
representation. Despite the lack of statistical evidence in favor of a
descriptive-substantive link, it remains viable, albeit largely unclear.
Therefore, I use a mixed-methods approach, coupling the

84
Pamela Paxton & Sheri Kunovich, Women’s Political Representation: The
Importance of Ideology, 82 SOC. FORCES 87, 90–91 (2003).
85 Id. at 91; Fallon et al., supra note 73, at 382.
86
Yann P. Kerevel & Lonna Rae Atkeson, Reducing Stereotypes of Female
Political Leaders in Mexico, 68 POL. RSCH. Q. 732, 738 (2015).
87 Id. at 734.
88
Fallon et al., supra note 73, at 382; Shvedova, supra note 38, at 33.
89
Fallon et al., supra note 73, at 399.
90
Shvedova, supra note 38, at 40.
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aforementioned statistical analyses with a case study of Argentina
and Chile to better understand the nature of the relationship.91
III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WOMEN IN GOVERNMENT AND
SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN PRACTICE
The Latin American region is often recognized as being a global
leader in terms of women’s descriptive representation.92 However,
Latin America has not seen women’s well-being increase in
proportion with their participation in formal politics. 93 Moreover,
there are huge disparities in the level of women’s development
between individual Latin American nations. 94 Because of the
different levels of development across countries, Latin America
offers a range of useful case studies to help illuminate the
relationship between descriptive representation and substantive
outcomes.
I examine two countries, Argentina and Chile, one with a low
level of women in government but a higher degree of substantive
outcomes (Chile) and the other with a high level of women in
government but a lower degree of substantive outcomes
(Argentina). 95 Argentina and Chile present a particularly useful
comparison because of their similar political and cultural histories,
and similar levels of economic development.96 The average GDP per
capita between 2000 and 2019 (in current U.S. dollars) was $9,271 in

91
See GARY KING, ROBERT O. KEOHANE & SIDNEY VERBA, DESIGNING SOCIAL
INQUIRY: SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE IN QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 69 (1994) (advocating for
inclusion of case studies to supplement statistical analyses).
92
In 2008, the average proportion of women in the single or lower house of
Latin American nations was 20%, second only to the Nordic countries. L ESLIE A.
SCHWINDT-BAYER, POLITICAL POWER AND WOMEN’S REPRESENTATION IN LATIN
AMERICA 3 (2010).
93
Jennifer M. Piscopo, Female Leadership and Sexual Health Policy in Argentina,
49 LAT. AM. RSCH. REV. 104, 105 (2014).
94
SCHWINDT-BAYER, supra note 92, at 33.
95
Here, substantive outcomes are the fifteen dependent variables I used in my
2018 honors thesis—primarily, the constituent elements of the GDI and the GII. See
Antonellis, supra note 69, at 86.
96
SCHWINDT-BAYER, supra note 92, at 34 (recognizing cultural and historical
similarities among countries in Latin America); Tricia Gray, Electoral Gender Quotas:
Lessons from Argentina and Chile, 22 BULL. LATIN AM. RSCH. 52, 52 (2003).
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Argentina and $10,992 in Chile. 97 Given the correlation between
economic development and gender equality, this similarity is crucial
in establishing a valid comparison between the two countries. 98
Furthermore, both countries have ratified the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW), albeit with reservations, and have been democracies
since the 1980s.99
The differences lie in their descriptive representation and
substantive outcomes. While Argentina boasts a relatively large
percentage of women in its legislature (over 40% in 2020), Chile has
only a modest proportion (about 23% in 2020). 100 In terms of
substantive outcomes, however, Chile outperforms Argentina in
nearly all the constituent elements of the Gender Development and
Gender Inequality Indices. 101 These cases and the differences
between them help to illuminate the nuances of the descriptivesubstantive link that go undetected by quantitative study alone.
Chilean women have been particularly successful in achieving
substantive outcomes due to effective women’s organizations, a
consensus-driven legislature, and a female-friendly executive. In
contrast, Argentinean women have been less successful due to a
fragmented and politically disconnected women’s movement, a lack
of critical actors within the legislature, an immensely strong partysystem (though this is also the case in Chile), and discrimination
against female legislators who occupy their seats due to gender
quotas.
97
GDP per capita (current US$) - Chile, Argentina, WORLD BANK,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?end=2019&locations=
CL-AR&most_recent_value_desc=true&start=1999
[https://perma.cc/8B3XH9JV];
DataBank:
Gender
Statistics,
WORLD
BANK,
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=gender-statistics
[https://perma.cc/3XCW-P33B].
98
See SCHWINDT-BAYER, supra note 92, at 43-44 (examining the connection
between socioeconomic factors and descriptive representation of women).
99
United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13; Chile, Period of
Democratic Transition: 1988-1989, Pro-Democracy Civic Movement: Present, FREEDOM
HOUSE, https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/inline_images/Chile.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PPC8-LGUM]; Argentina, Period of Democratic Transition: 19821983,
Pro-Democracy
Civic
Movement:
Present,
FREEDOM
HOUSE,
https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/inline_images/Argentina.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2EY5-QY6A].
100 Gender Statistics, WORLD BANK, supra note 97.
101
Antonellis, supra note 69, at 86.
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a. Historical Background
Argentina and Chile, like their Latin American neighbors, have
a highly comparable political and social history.102 Colonial legacies
in both countries have left severe inequalities on the basis of race,
class, geography, and gender. 103 Twentieth century legal codes
made it so that husbands held immense power over their wives,
effectively separating the public from the private, the men from the
women, and the political from the apolitical.104 From cultural norms
to bouts of military dictatorship, several factors are common to both
countries, making them ideal cases to compare. That said, no two
countries have the same history, and while Argentina and Chile are
indeed quite similar, they are different in ways that are exceedingly
important to the relationship between descriptive representation
and substantive outcomes.
The prominence of religious doctrine and the political strength
of the Catholic Church are characteristic of both countries. 105
Christian fundamentalism is often associated with conservative,
right-wing values. 106 In the case of women’s development, this
means a resistance toward gender equality. 107 Consequently, the
Church has posed a significant barrier to both legislatures’ ability to
promote substantive outcomes. 108 Policies contrary to religious
102
See generally SCHWINDT-BAYER, supra note 92, at 33-37, 41-45 (discussing the
similar socioeconomic and cultural backgrounds of Latin American countries).
103
Susan Franceschet et al., Supermadres, Maternal Legacies and Women’s
Political Participation in Contemporary Latin America, 48 J. LAT. AM. STUD. 1, 5 (2015).
104 Id. at 6.
105 Schwindt-Bayer, supra note 89, at 42 (“[T]he Catholic Church is a strong
influence in society and politics in all Latin American countries, with only minimal
variation across countries.”).
106
Ruud Koopmans, Religious Fundamentalism and Hostility Against OutGroups: A Comparison of Muslims and Christians in Western Europe, 41 J. ETHNIC &
MIGRATION STUD. 33, 38 (2015).
107
See SCHWINDT-BAYER, supra note 92, at 41 (“[C]ertain religious
denominations with more restrictive views of women’s equality, such as
Catholicism, have fewer women in office than those with more accepting views of
gender equity . . . .”). Contra RADICAL WOMEN IN LATIN AMERICA: LEFT AND RIGHT
226-28 (Victoria González & Karen Kampwirth eds., 2001) (discussing how certain
religious women’s groups in South America pursued actions increasing gender
equality)
108
See SUSAN FRANCESCHET, WOMEN AND POLITICS IN CHILE 105 (2005)
(discussing the implications of the conservative moral and social climate in Chile
for women’s substantive representation and how the Catholic Church informs that
climate).
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doctrine, (e.g., legalizing abortion or divorce) have proven nearimpossible to pass. 109 Organizations like the Sisters of the Sacred
Heart in Chile, the League of Chilean Ladies, and the League of
Argentine Catholic Ladies emerged with the goal of upholding
morality by taming women and resisting leftist movements.110
In Argentina, the rhetoric of Church officials historically
emphasized the family as being the foundation of society, with
women, acting as the chief moral agents, remaining in the private
sphere. 111 In Chile, too, the allure of religious conservativism
manifested itself in right-wing political groups which promoted
women as mothers and models of domesticity.112 This relegation of
women to the private, moral realm has been accompanied by an
ideology of anti-politics, or the belief that government and politics
are corrupt, immoral, and unfit for women. 113 In both countries,
there remains a split between the public sphere (i.e., the economic
and political arenas) and the private sphere (i.e., the home). With
more of an emphasis on family-life and women as homemakers, and
109
See Virginia Guzmán et al., Democracy in the Country but Not in the Home?
Religion, Politics and Women’s Rights in Chile, 31 THIRD WORLD Q. 971, 972 (2010)
(highlighting the political influence of the Catholic Church in Chile); see also Walsh,
supra note 79, at 1326 (“In Chile, the commitment of the leading party to Catholic
dogma did not bode well for legalizing abortion or divorce.”); Ligia M. De Jesus,
Abortion in Latin America and the Caribbean: A Comparative Study of Domestic Laws and
Relevant Jurisprudence Following the Adoption of the American Convention on Human
Rights, 20 INT’L L. STUDENT ASS’N J. INT’L & COMPAR. L. 1, 43 (2013) (noting that Chile
is one of seven Latin American and Caribbean countries that, until recently, had
adopted a full abortion ban).
110
RADICAL WOMEN IN LATIN AMERICA: LEFT AND RIGHT, supra note 107, at 22627 (highlighting how aristocratic women in Chile organized labor unions “designed
to Christianize and tame working women—and thus preserve the Ladies’ position
at the top of the class hierarchy.”). See generally María de los Angeles Crummett, El
Poder Feminino: The Mobilization of Women Against Socialism in Chile, 4 LATIN AM.
PERSP. 103, 107-09 (1977) (describing a Chilean women’s movement that was
staunchly anti-Marxist); Paul H. Lewis, The ‘Gender Gap’ in Chile, 36 J. LAT AM. STUD.
719, 735 (2004) (explaining that women in Chile have tended to vote more
conservatively).
111
See Ana María Marini, Women in Contemporary Argentina, 4 LATIN AM.
PERSPS. 114, 116 (1977) (highlighting how family was praised as the foundation of
society and the media constantly chastised parents to keep a close eye on their
children).
112
RADICAL WOMEN IN LATIN AMERICA: LEFT AND RIGHT, supra note 107, at 23841.
113 See id. at 226, 238-40 (discussing how women’s admission into right-wing
political organizations was conditioned on their participation being non-political);
id. at 273-75 (discussing “antipolitics” and women’s movements); see also SCHWINDTBAYER, supra note 92, at 41 (highlighting a perception that women belong in the
‘private sphere’ and men belong in the ‘public sphere’).
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less of an emphasis on equality and women as individuals,
Argentina and Chile share cultural history.
Even as society progressed during the late-1900s and early2000s, women in both countries were still viewed primarily as
mothers.114 The terms “supermadre” and “militant mother” refer to
women’s taking advantage of their caring roles as a tool to
participate in the public sphere—a characterization that has both
helped and hurt women’s access to formal politics. 115 During the
military dictatorships in Argentina and Chile, women tended to
utilize this traditional “supermadre” frame to protest human rights
abuses, emphasizing their motherly role to legitimize their political
activity. 116 As recently as the early-2000s, however, when both
countries were led by female presidents, maternalistic frames—and
consequently, gender inequality—remained.117
b. Case Study: Chile
i.

Women in Culture and Society

As a result of the economic downturn under President Salvador
Allende during the early-1970s, political opposition painted the
government as the cause of economic hardships to mobilize women
against the government. 118 One women’s organization, Poder
Feminino, was instrumental in ousting Allende and making way for
the regime of Augusto Pinochet.119 When the military took over in
1973, Pinochet dissolved Poder Feminino and forced its members to
return to the domestic sphere.120 Despite the support for Pinochet
Franceschet et al., supra note 103, at 7.
Id. at 2; SCHWINDT-BAYER, supra note 92, at 35.
116
Franceschet et al., supra note 103, at 9.
117 See id. at 11, 14, 31 (discussing how maternalism’s legacy has persisted for
women in politics); see also Alice Colón & Sara Poggio, Women’s Work and Neoliberal
Globalization: Implications for Gender Equality, in WOMEN’S ACTIVISM IN LATIN
AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: ENGENDERING SOCIAL JUSTICE, DEMOCRATIZING
CITIZENSHIP 56-57 (Elizabeth Maier & Nathalie Lebon eds., 2010) (arguing that
gender equity cannot be achieved without “breaking down stereotypes that define
power and scientific and mechanical capacities as masculine traits,” specifically by
redistributing domestic responsibility between men and women).
118
de los Angeles Crummett, supra note 110, at 111.
119
RADICAL WOMEN IN LATIN AMERICA: LEFT AND RIGHT, supra note 107, at 274.
120 Id. at 305; de los Angeles Crummett, supra note 110, at 112.
114

115
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amongst women’s organizations, women were not given authentic
leadership positions within his regime.121 The underlying message
was that it was acceptable for women to be politically active so long
as they remained outside the realm of formal politics. Women’s
support for Pinochet therefore reinforced the limited role of
women’s political engagement.122
Throughout the Pinochet-era, women were seen as unique in
their ability to rise above partisan politics, which were especially
strong in Chile. And while Argentina was also home to anti-political
ideology, the staunch belief in nonpartisan, apolitical unity was
unique to Chilean women. 123 Consequently, women were
responsible for uniting the Chilean people, protecting the home, and
resisting the corruption of government. Despite their prominence in
this regard, however, the women-as-apolitical rhetoric has remained
a barrier to women’s formal participation in politics today. It is
partly for this reason that Chilean women have been relatively
unsuccessful in increasing their descriptive representation, even
since the transition to democracy in the 1980s. 124 By mobilizing
against partisan politics, women effectively solidified the notion that
they were apolitical, and therefore, unfit for office.125 Nonetheless,
women maintained a strong, albeit private, political consciousness
throughout the Pinochet-era.126
In 1988, the people of Chile voted to end the regime of Pinochet,
replacing him in 1990 with the first democratically elected president
since 1973, Patricio Aylwin.127 Though women were far more likely
than their male counterparts to have supported Pinochet in the 1988
plebiscite, a slight majority of the female population voted against
121
When Pinochet took power, he appointed a number of women (many from
within Poder Feminino) to government positions. However, they were largely used
as pawns in his anti-political agenda, not as authentic representatives of the female
community. See RADICAL WOMEN IN LATIN AMERICA: LEFT AND RIGHT, supra note 107,
at 284, 295.
122 See id. at 309 (highlighting a speech wherein a public figure identified
herself as an apolitical woman but nonetheless called for women’s support of
Pinochet’s regime in an upcoming referendum).
123 Id. at 276.
124
See id. at 282 (contending that women’s ability to reach nonpartisan
solutions solidified a dominant view that women had no place in politics). But see
id. at 282 (describing how some leaders of non-partisan movements translated their
“participation in the movement into electoral capital for female candidates”).
125 Id.
126 Id. at 322; de los Angeles Crummett, supra note 110, at 112–13.
127
RADICAL WOMEN IN LATIN AMERICA: LEFT AND RIGHT, supra note 107, at 321.
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him and—as with the overthrow of the Allende presidency—played
a significant role in ending his regime.128 In fact, women’s rejection
of Pinochet demonstrated that they were not necessarily staunch
conservatives and were a key electoral group, capable of influencing
the upcoming democratic election. 129 Women had re-organized
against Pinochet to protest the violence and human rights abuses
that Chileans faced under the dictator. 130 It is from these antiPinochet, pro-democracy organizations that the women’s
movement emerged. 131 The massive and widespread support for
this pro-human rights platform made it so that women’s issues
pervaded all classes and parties.132
During the 1980s, the women’s movement was united across
identities, which made it particularly powerful.133 Whether women
were protesting on behalf of human rights, feminism, or economic
equality, they were united in their desire for democracy, their
rejection of Pinochet, and their belief that women’s concerns
deserved a place in formal politics.134 Therefore, around 1987, when
calls for democracy were strong and the 1988 plebiscite was
approaching, the women’s movement, led by the Coalition of
Women for Democracy, shifted its focus from protest to policy.135
The fact that significantly more women had voted to keep Pinochet
in power than men was used strategically by women’s organizations
to force political parties to incorporate women’s demands into their
platforms.136 That said, some of their demands were considered too

Id. at 320; Lewis, supra note 110, at 726.
Walsh, supra note 79, at 1337.
130
RADICAL WOMEN IN LATIN AMERICA: LEFT AND RIGHT, supra note 107, at 286.
131 Id. at 292; see also Walsh, supra note 79, at 1336 (citing various women’s
organizations in Chile that were at the ideological forefront of the women’s
movement).
132
RADICAL WOMEN IN LATIN AMERICA: LEFT AND RIGHT, supra note 107, at 29293.
133
LISA BALDEZ, WHY WOMEN PROTEST: WOMEN’S MOVEMENTS IN CHILE 147
(2002); see also Walsh, supra note 79, at 1327 (offering more context on women’s
movements in Chile).
134
BALDEZ, supra note 133, at 149, 162-67; see also Walsh, supra note 79, at 1327,
1333-34 (discussing Chilean political history in the late twentieth century with an
emphasis on women’s movements).
135
BALDEZ, supra note 133, at 161, 175; Walsh, supra note 79, at 1327; see also
Misra, supra note 6, at 411 (noting the ability of women’s movements, generally, to
put policy pressure on legislators and other government agents).
136
BALDEZ, supra note 133, at 174-175.
128

129
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radical and were therefore ignored in the formal political sphere.137
Despite the dismissal of certain issues, however, the strength and
prominence of the women’s movement made it so that nearly every
party paid attention to women’s issues.138
Political parties had been forced underground during the
Pinochet-era, thereby closing the avenues of formal politics.139 This
made it so that the informal political arena—where women’s
organizations thrived—became the primary site of political
activism.140 Later, when democracy returned and the party system
regained its strength, many women’s organizations united with
these formal parties, rather than attempting to remain
autonomous. 141 By cooperating with political parties—a
phenomenon known as “double militancy”—the women’s
movement helped to put women’s issues on the map. 142 The
Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia, a powerful coalition of
political parties established in 1988 and led by Patricio Aylwin, was
particularly amenable to women’s rights. 143 Specifically, Aylwin’s
platform included the creation of a ministry for women, positive
discrimination to increase representation, relief programs for poor
women, and legislation on domestic violence and equal pay. 144
Ultimately, women were able to leverage their power to lobby for

137
FRANCESCHET, supra note 108, at 75-78. The Coalition of Women for
Democracy lobbied for a 30% quota, much like the one Argentina would later
adopt, but this attempt to interfere in candidate selection was infuriating to party
leaders. Walsh, supra note 79, at 1335.
138
FRANCESCHET, supra note 108, at 78; see also Walsh, supra note 79, at 1324,
1333 (arguing that when women can speak out in the leading institutions in the
public sphere, women’s rights will be better represented in politics; this was the
case in Chile).
139
FRANCESCHET, supra note 108, at 58.
140
Walsh, supra note 79, at 1333 (“Pinochet’s military regime committed
massive human rights violations, banned political parties, cracked down on labor
unions, put the Church under surveillance, censored the media, and closed
parliament. Yet grassroots organizations emerged in the 1980s and demanded
democracy. Initially, women’s organizations led the charge, and openness and
inclusiveness were impressive.”).
141 Id. at 1334–36.
142
FRANCESCHET, supra note 108, at 81. This phenomenon by which women’s
organizations ally with pro-democracy forces and thereby increase their political
influence has been seen in several other cases, including Brazil, Spain, and South
Africa. Id.
143
Walsh, supra note 79, at 1326.
144
BALDEZ, supra note 133, at 178; Walsh, supra note 79, at 1338.
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the inclusion of concrete demands into party platforms—which has
helped to promote substantive outcomes.145
Despite this progress, women remained in traditional roles even
after democracy was reinstated. 146 Women were protesting as
mothers, a phenomenon known as “maternalistic politics,” by which
women enter the political sphere because of their motherly duty to
protect their families.147 Because their protests revolved primarily
around human rights abuses, women largely disappeared from the
public sector as soon as these abuses ceased. Post-Pinochet, women
therefore reverted back to life within the private sphere.148 By basing
their political activity on their duty as mothers, women fell into a
cycle of “crisis politics” whereby they became active to protest
injustice and withdrew back to the private sphere when justice was
realized.149
While embracing their motherly role had allowed women to
thrive as human rights activists, it severely limited their ability to be
included in formal politics.150 Women’s organizations attempted to
use their fight for democracy as a segue towards their call for
women’s representation; however, the notion that a woman was
more than just a mother did not resonate within Chilean society.151
Furthermore, the female community itself exhibited a lack of interest
in certain measures designed to promote descriptive representation,
specifically gender quotas.152 Most women instead saw their place
as existing within informal social movements and felt electing
women was not part of their objective. 153 Nonetheless, women in
Chile have been able to exist as strong, albeit informal, political
145 BALDEZ, supra note 133, at 172; Walsh, supra note 79, at 1326-27, 1337;
SERENA COSGROVE, LEADERSHIP FROM THE MARGINS: WOMEN AND CIVIL SOCIETY
ORGANIZATIONS IN ARGENTINA, CHILE, AND EL SALVADOR 123 (2010); Gray, supra note
96, at 65. Women were able to lobby Pinochet himself to amend the Civil Code,
granting women full civil rights, and ratify the CEDAW in 1989 as part of a lastditch effort to regain women’s electoral support. BALDEZ, supra note 133, at 178-179;
Walsh, supra note 79, at 1337.
146
FRANCESCHET, supra note 108, at 59.
147
Betilde V. Munoz, Where Are the Women? The Case of Chilean Women: 19731989, 74 INT’L SOC. SCI. REV. 3, 11 (1999).
148 Id. at 17.
149
Rita K. Noonan, Women Against the State: Political Opportunities and
Collective Action Frames in Chile’s Transition to Democracy, 10 SOCIO. F. 81, 107 (1995).
150
FRANCESCHET, supra note 108, at 64.
151 Id. at 72–73.
152 Id. at 99-100.
153 Id. at 76; BALDEZ, supra note 133, at 187.
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actors—despite their low descriptive representation—due to the
strength of the women’s movement and the unity of the female
community, which made them a large and valuable electoral
constituency.154
ii.

Women in Politics and the Law

The relatively low proportion of women in the Chilean
legislature seems odd given the fact that Chile has had several,
significant policy achievements for gender equality. 155 There are
many countries, however, where female-friendly legislation has
passed, despite a lack of women in the legislature—Chile being one
of them.156 Several factors contribute to this relatively low level of
descriptive representation. First, the binomial majoritarian electoral
system in Chile has made it difficult for women to gain access to
formal politics. Parties outside of the two main coalitions
(essentially, the center-right and the center-left) do not win
legislative seats, which leads to a conflation of the nonpartisan with
the nonpolitical. Because women’s organizations largely operate
outside of the major party coalitions, women’s issues are seen as
existing outside of politics entirely.157
Second, unlike Argentina, Chile does not have any form of a
gender quota to increase descriptive representation within its
legislature. Parties have played a large role in this, resisting any sort
of mechanism to increase the presence of female legislators. 158
Candidate selection therefore remains up to the parties and women
are largely left off party lists. 159 Even outside the formal political
realm, there has not been a unified desire for a quota, as many see it
as unnecessary to democracy. 160 Ultimately then, Chile’s electoral
system, plus the strength of its parties and resistance to quotas, has
FRANCESCHET, supra note 108, at 81.
Id. at 85; Gray, supra note 96, at 69.
156
Mala Htun & S. Laurel Weldon, When Do Governments Promote Women’s
Rights? A Framework for the Comparative Analysis of Sex Equality Policy, 8 PERSPS. ON
POL. 207, 208 (2010).
157
FRANCESCHET, supra note 108, at 89.
158
Walsh, supra note 79, at 1335.
159 Id.; Galligan, supra note 46, at 330.
160
FRANCESCHET, supra note 108, at 99; see also Walsh, supra note 79, at 1335
(noting that while the Coalition of Women for Democracy lobbied for a quota, they
were unsuccessful).
154

155
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artificially deflated its descriptive representation, effectively making
it lower than it “should” be.161
For the few women who have successfully earned a position in
public office, the perception of them as mothers or caretakers has
limited their political capacity in a way that is more pronounced
than in other countries.162 The belief that women are apolitical and
of a superior moral character than men furthers the belief that
women belong in politics only during crisis situations. Female
legislators, therefore, have no part in the day-to-day administration
of government. 163 Furthermore, their perceived differences as
compared to men (i.e., their morality and caretaking ability) have
been construed as a disadvantage and have effectively led to a
tendency of male politicians to disregard their female colleagues.164
With few women in its legislature and a lack of power among those
few, women’s development seems unlikely.
How is it, then, that Chile has produced such a high degree of
substantive outcomes? 165 Again, several factors contribute. First,
much of Pinochet’s influence remains in the wake of his
dictatorship. However distant in the past, military dictatorship is a
political crisis that creates enduring pressures.166 In the case of Chile,
this has meant a lasting effect on the tendency of certain women’s
issues to be addressed in the formal political arena. Throughout the
legislature, there is a prevailing fear of conflict that prevents
lawmakers from proposing radical legislation. So, while the Chilean
legislature tends to put forward fewer bills than does Argentina’s—
largely as a result of their aversion to conflict—they are more
successful in getting bills passed as a result of the broad-based
support that bills typically have amongst the parties. 167 This
“pathological search for consensus” has made it so that divisive
issues—notably, abortion and divorce—are avoided in legislative
SCHWINDT-BAYER, supra note 92, at 60.
FRANCESCHET, supra note 108, at 36.
163 Id. at 2.
164 Id. at 7.
165
To be sure, women in Chile have not achieved gender equality—a fact that
is particularly obvious within the political arena. Id. at 1.
166
Dursun Peksen, Foreign Military Intervention and Women’s Rights, 48 J. PEACE
RSCH. 455, 456 (2011).
167
BALDEZ, supra note 133, at 183; Susan Franceschet, Gendered Institutions and
Women’s Substantive Representation: Female Legislators in Argentina and Chile, in
GENDER, POLITICS, AND INSTITUTIONS: TOWARD A FEMINIST INSTITUTIONALISM 58, 80
(Mona Lena Krook & Fiona Mackay eds., 2011).
161
162
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debate. 168 The result is a lack of bills that challenge traditional
gender norms and an abundance of “role-based” bills—those that
seek to improve women’s lives as mothers, rather than as
individuals.169
Second, the belief in the existence of some fundamental
difference between the sexes has actually helped women. Due to
their inherently non-maleness, women are seen as deserving of
special attention from the political process. In this way, male
legislators have promoted women’s rights as a way of protecting
their female constituents.170 Though non-ideal in terms of long-term
gender equality, this dynamic has led the Chilean legislature to
produce numerous female-friendly pieces of legislation and,
ultimately, better substantive outcomes.171 Between 1990 and 1997,
half of the proposed bills pertaining to gender equality passed the
Chilean legislature—a relatively high passage rate, let alone for
gender equality issues. As is to be expected, however, these laws
have largely been based on the family and women’s role as mothers,
rather than on their rights as individuals.172 Effectively, women have
succeeded in getting numerous gender equality measures on the
agenda, despite their failure to enter political office.173
Third, Chile has a history of moderately progressive women’s
politics, despite the fact that it is one of the most politically
conservative countries in Latin America. 174 For example, women
have had the legal right to take maternity leave since 1919, nearly
three decades before they were even able to vote. 175 However, as
previously mentioned, this and other progressive policies have been
enacted largely for the purpose of protecting mothers, not
168
FRANCESCHET, supra note 108, at 31; see also Wash, supra note 79, at 1335
(noting that the Coalition of Women for Democracy itself excluded far left or rightwing groups, instead opting for more pragmatic gender policies so as not to
exacerbate tension between parties).
169
Merike H. Blofield & Liesl Haas, Defining a Democracy: Reforming the Laws
on Women’s Rights in Chile, 1990-2002, 47 LATIN AM. POL. & SOC’Y 35, 41 (2005).
170
FRANCESCHET, supra note 108, at 11.
171
Blofield & Haas, supra note 169, at 64.
172
BALDEZ, supra note 133, at 183. Chile’s abortion ban provides further
evidence of this observation. See generally De Jesus, supra note 109 (arguing that
abortion prohibitions and exceptions in Latin America and the Caribbean ignore
the rights of women).
173
FRANCESCHET, supra note 108, at 94.
174 Id. at 13.
175
Lidia Casas & Tania Herrera, Maternity Protection vs. Maternity Rights for
Working Women in Chile: A Historical Review, 20 REPROD. HEALTH MATTERS 139, 139
(2012).
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empowering women as individuals. That is to say that, in Chile,
female-friendly legislation has been role-based rather than rightsbased. 176 In this way, Chile has successfully passed a number of
female-friendly bills, despite having a relatively low level of women
in its national legislature. 177 Things like maternity leave and
women’s health have been particularly easy to legislate given the
importance that is placed on mothers and families in Chilean
society. Maternal health laws in Chile have been tremendously
successful in reducing maternal mortality, infant mortality, and
fertility rates.178 Historically, women have been seen as deserving of
their rights and government services only when they have
conformed to their proper social role as mothers.179 In Chile, this has
been successful because so many women (willingly or not) maintain
this traditional role; women’s rights tend to correlate with mother’s
rights.
Fourth and perhaps most important to Chile’s success in terms
of women’s socio-economic development is the support for
women’s issues within the executive branch.180 This began with the
creation of a women’s ministry in 1991, after Patricio Aylwin came
to power. 181 The National Women’s Service (SERNAM) has often
been criticized for its exclusion of women’s movements and popular
feminism, but it nonetheless retains near-unilateral control of
women’s issue legislation because of its place within the executive
branch. 182 SERNAM has been notably successful in its efforts to
lobby for gender equality legislation. 183 Furthermore, while the
strength and unity of the women’s movement in Chile has declined
since the late-1900s, the role of SERNAM has expanded, making it
so that the presence of women’s issues in formal politics has
176 For examples of legislation aimed at protecting aspects of motherhood but
not necessarily protecting women themselves, see id. at 140. Cf. Blofield & Haas,
supra note 169, at 41 (reporting that “more rights-based bills than role-based bills
have been introduced” in Chile).
177
Casas & Herrera, supra note 175, at 141.
178 Id. at 142. Here, it is again important to note the normative judgments
involved in deeming certain outcomes to be positive. A lower fertility rate, for
example, is not universally thought of as being a desirable outcome.
179 Id. at 145.
180
FRANCESCHET, supra note 108, at 102.
181
BALDEZ, supra note 133, at 182.
182
FRANCESCHET, supra note 108, at 129.
183
COSGROVE, supra note 145, at 125; Blofield & Haas, supra note 169, at 41;
TORILD SKARD, WOMEN OF POWER: HALF A CENTURY OF FEMALE PRESIDENTS AND PRIME
MINISTERS WORLDWIDE 227 (2014).
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remained constant. 184 In fact, a number of women chose to join
SERNAM as the women’s movement began to wane postPinochet.185 Having more women in ministerial positions can have a
substantial effect on women’s development.186 In terms of helping to
produce female-friendly legislation, women’s agencies, like
SERNAM, have been found to be even more effective than women’s
descriptive representation, especially when combined with a strong
women’s movement.187
Moreover, specific members of the executive branch have been
able to exert their influence on the legislative process. Because
Chile’s executive branch determines the legislative agenda, and
because it has more resources with which to influence legislation,188
female-friendly executives—e.g., former-President Michelle
Bachelet—have effectively outweighed any lack of support for
women’s issues in the legislature and helped promote gender
equality.189 Former-President Michelle Bachelet has had a great deal
of influence on Chile’s incorporation of international norms into
domestic law, as well. Chile has been historically open to
international pressure and Bachelet, as former Director of UN
Women and current High Commissioner for Human Rights, has
been a highly effective advocate for international law in Chile.190 For
example, Bachelet explicitly referenced the CEDAW when
introducing an abortion decriminalization bill, which passed in
2017.191
Chilean women’s lack of descriptive representation is therefore
effectively negated by the presence of progressive legislation aimed
FRANCESCHET, supra note 108, at 147.
COSGROVE, supra note 145, at 125.
186
Egle Iturbe De Blanco, Women: Power and Development in Latin America, 5 U.
ST. THOMAS L.J. 675, 690 (2008).
187
Piscopo, supra note 93, at 107; Misra, supra note 6, at 411.
188
FRANCESCHET, supra note 108, at 104-05
189
See SKARD supra note 183, at 230 (discussing some of the advancements in
gender equality that came about during Former-President Bachelet’s
administration).
190
See Kelsey Zorzi, The Impact of the United Nations on National Abortion Laws,
65 CATH. U. L. REV. 409, 422-23 (2015) (describing actions by President Bachelet);
Caroline Davidson, Nunca Más Meets #Niunamenos: Accountability for Pinochet-Era
Sexual Violence in Chile, 51 COLUM. HUMAN RTS. L. REV. 100, 172 (2019) (discussing
the impact of a figure who worked under President Bachelet); Walsh, supra note 79,
at 1326 (highlighting the impact of international actions and pressure on women’s
rights in Chile).
191
Cosette D. Creamer & Beth A. Simmons, The Dynamic Impact of Periodic
Review on Women’s Rights, 81 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 31, 63-65 (2018).
184

185
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at protecting mothers, as well as support within executive branch
from both SERNAM and former-President Michelle Bachelet.
However, the dedication to women’s interests that can be seen
within Chilean politics is also a result of factors outside of the
political arena—namely, a strong and united women’s movement
that successfully lobbied for the inclusion of women’s issues into
formal, party politics.192 Ultimately, Chile has a perfect combination
of the elements of the “triangle of empowerment”—a women’s
movement, a women’s agency, and women legislators.193
c. Case Study: Argentina
i.

Women in Culture and Society

Juan Perón was one of the few Argentinean presidents to realize
the value of women’s support for his administration, given that they
comprised such a massive, cross-class coalition. 194 Perón’s
popularity amongst Argentinean women was largely due to the
following gained by his then-wife, Eva Perón.195 When he was first
elected in 1946, Perón put Eva in charge of promoting women’s
development. Her first success came in 1947 when women earned
the right to vote and hold office—despite opposition from the
feminist movement, which saw suffrage as a façade. 196 Later, at
Eva’s urging, Perón added marriage equality to the Argentinean
Constitution, greatly improving women’s legal position in doing
so.197 Moreover, the first women elected to Argentina’s Chamber of
Deputies in 1951—twenty-four of them—were all Peronistas.198 Eva
See supra Section III.b.i.
Misra, supra note 6, at 412.
194
MARIFRAN CARLSON, ¡FEMINISMO!: THE WOMAN’S MOVEMENT IN ARGENTINA
FROM ITS BEGINNINGS TO EVA PERÓN 186 (2005).
195 Id. at 187.
196 See id. at 189. While Perón himself played a crucial role in fighting for
women’s suffrage, he likely did so as a way to increase his popularity by making
women an instrument for his own political power. See id. (noting that Eva Perón
marketed women’s suffrage as a means of joint political participation with their
partners to support the Peronist agenda).
197 Id. at 190-91.
198 Id. at 193. During the same year, Inés Enriquez Frödden became the first
woman elected to Chile’s national legislature. MART MARTIN, THE ALMANAC OF
WOMEN AND MINORITIES IN WORLD POLITICS 78 (2000).
192
193
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captured the hearts of working-class women, helping to garner
support for Peronism by fighting for improvements in their daily
lives. 199 Despite the improvements she made, however, Eva was
vehemently anti-feminist, opting instead for the traditional view of
women as responsible for upholding morality within society. She
believed that women were to follow men, especially Juan Perón, in
their political activism.200
After two terms as president, Perón was exiled by a military
government in 1955. When democracy returned in 1973, he was
elected for a third term. Perón later died during his presidency in
1974, leaving his then-wife, Isabel Martínez de Perón, to take over.
Largely illiterate and lacking education, she struggled as president;
the economy crashed, inflation spiked, and terrorism broke out
during her term, leading to another military coup in 1976. 201 Her
failure was largely seen as having been a result of her gender and
consequently delegitimized women as formal political actors.202
The military ruled with brutal force, murdering and
disappearing tens of thousands of Argentineans.203 Consequently,
the Mothers of Plaza de Mayo were established to search for
disappeared persons. 204 As in Chile, women in Argentina united
against the military dictatorship under the broad goal of human
rights. 205 The difference between the women’s movements in
Argentina and Chile, however, lies in their aftermath—specifically,
the transition from military dictatorship to democracy.206 Women’s
organized activism allows women’s voices to be heard in a
politically relevant setting and is therefore one of the “most
important mechanisms” for promoting substantive outcomes.207 In
Argentina, the women’s movement was unable to demand concrete
policies due to internal weakness and a lack of broad-based power.
In fact, while Argentina had many women participating in civil
199
200
201
202
203

at 95.

CARLSON, supra note 194, at 191-92.
Id. at 195.
MARTIN, supra note 198, at 10.
Marini, supra note 111, at 116.
WOMEN’S ACTIVISM IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, supra note 117,

Id.
Id.
206
Gray, supra note 96, at 53.
207
American Society of International Law, Women’s Rights Internationally:
Mainstreaming Versus Backsliding, 93 PROC. ANN. MEETING AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 82, 83
(1999).
204
205
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society organizations, few organizations were dedicated solely to
women or gender equality. 208 Formal political forces must work
together with civil society organizations in the fight for women’s
equality. 209 Without popular, bottom-up support, women’s
development in Argentina did not receive attention from those who
had the power to promote it.
One exception to the inability of the women’s movement to
translate protest into policy is the gender quota. Unlike in Chile,
Argentinean women’s organizations were united in their desire for
a quota.210 When pressure from these organizations combined with
strong support from then-President Carlos Menem, the quota
passed in 1991, making it mandatory for party lists to include
women in 30% of electable positions and making Argentina the first
Latin American nation to adopt such a law.211 As a direct result, the
proportion of women in Argentina’s national legislature increased
by more than 30%, making Argentina a leader in the region. 212
During the time that the quota was being debated, however, there
arose two very different justifications for its passage. The first saw
it as a tool to promote gender equality and democratic ideals. The
second saw it as a tool to promote morality in the legislature by way
of women’s femininity.213 The latter of the two explanations proved
more compelling to male voters and legislators, despite detracting
from the law’s legitimacy as promoting gender equality.214
Because the law was framed around traditional conceptions of
female behavior, women elected as part of the quota were expected
to uphold this feminine ideal. That said, while Argentina has
historically seen women primarily as mothers, rather than
individuals, they have progressed further past the maternalistic

208
See WOMEN’S ACTIVISM IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, supra note
117, at 167 (noting that many civil society organizations shared common objectives
that did not necessarily center women’s issues).
209
Kavita Krishnan, Sacred Spaces, Secular Norms and Women’s Rights, 41 ECON.
& POL. WKLY. 2969, 2969 (2006); Galligan, supra note 44, at 333.
210
Gloria Bonder & Marcela Nari, The 30 Percent Quota Law: A Turning Point
for Women’s Political Participation in Argentina, in A RISING PUBLIC VOICE: WOMEN IN
POLITICS WORLDWIDE 183, 187 (Alida Brill ed., 1995).
211
Aili Mari Tripp, Creating Collective Capabilities: Women, Agency and the
Politics of Representation, 19 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 219, 243 (2010).
212
Iturbe De Blanco, supra note 186, at 684.
213
Bonder & Nari, supra note 210, at 189.
214 Id. at 190.
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politics that remain so strong in Chile.215 Women in Argentina are
viewed as individuals, equal to their male counterparts. 216 And
while that may seem desirable from a liberal individual rights
perspective, it has actually been prohibitive in terms of the country’s
ability to achieve substantive outcomes for women.217
Furthermore, Argentina is one of few nations that has directly
incorporated the CEDAW into its Constitution. 218 Argentina’s
verbatim replica of the treaty is unique, making it the only country
to grant it constitutional standing.219 As a result, domestic laws are
subject to the international norms set forth in the Convention. 220
Consequently, “every right, every privilege, every guarantee, that
the anointed human rights treaties grant are part of Argentina’s
Constitution.”221 Chile’s Constitution, on the other hand, is far more
ambiguous in terms of the deference it grants to international law.222
Consequently, one might think that, at least in terms of compliance
with the CEDAW, Argentina would be doing exceptionally well. On
the ground, however, Argentina’s “constitutionalization”
experiment has turned out to be a hollow promise.223 This positive
legal change has not triggered a corresponding social or cultural
change.224 While Argentina has done many things “right,” from a
social policy perspective, these policies have not translated into
outcomes.

215
Compare Tripp, supra note 211, at 242 (noting that Argentine politics have
moved beyond collectively identifying women as mothers or wives), with
FRANCESCHET, supra note 108, at 36 (identifying Chilean women’s movements as
persistently invoking notions of maternalism).
216
Tripp, supra note 211, at 242 (“Women are not conceived of as a collective
body or thought of as mothers or wives. Instead, the Constitution seeks to put them
on an equal footing with men and to be seen as peers (se equiparan).”).
217 See id. at 221 (“Interestingly, many of the countries with the largest gaps in
political equality between genders have tended to treat women’s rights through a
liberal individual rights frame.”).
218
Janet Koven Levit, The Constitutionalization of Human Rights in Argentina:
Problem or Promise?, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 281, 291 n.44 (1999).
219 Id. at 292.
220 Id. at 310.
221 Id. at 312.
222 Id. at 305.
223 Id. at 313
224
See id. at 344 (claiming in part that the constitutional change did not
precipitate social or cultural change because of the weakness of law as an institution
in Argentina).
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Women in Politics and the Law

While it may be true that progress can be made without a strong
female presence in the legislature, representation at least increases
the probability of women’s voices being heard within the formal
political arena.225 Why, then, is this not the case in Argentina, where
more than a third of the national legislature is female? Unlike Chile,
Argentina boasts an extremely high proportion of women in its
national legislature but has a lower level of substantive
representation. This is due to a variety of factors that weaken the
descriptive-substantive link.
First, having women in a legislature is not sufficient to produce
outcomes—the type of woman matters. While some authors have
emphasized the necessity of a critical mass of women in the
legislature, others have found little evidence of a critical mass’s
effect on women’s legislative effectiveness.226 Critical mass theory
states that when descriptive representation reaches a certain
threshold, women are more likely to demonstrate authentic
leadership that differs from that of men, rather than conform to the
normal, male behavior. 227 Below that threshold, the relationship
between descriptive and substantive representation is thought to be
weaker.228 According to the UN, when the proportion of women in
a governing body is below 30%, women may be unable to garner the
support they need to pass female-friendly legislation and may not
even have the power to propose such legislation in the first place.229
As more women enter a legislature, however, the coalitions they
form grow larger and more influential. 230 Consequently, a critical
mass may present a more threatening sub-group to male legislators,
causing a backlash of increased scrutiny and competition for
political power.231 Furthermore, institutional constraints and party
PHILLIPS, supra note 4, at 83; see supra Section II.a.
PAXTON & HUGHES, supra note 13, at 217-18.
227
Funk, supra note 41, at 572.
228
Schwindt-Bayer & Mishler, supra note 63, at 413.
229
Swiss et al., supra note 66, at 531; Paxton et al., supra note 43, at 274 (noting
disagreement as to the necessary “critical mass” for women to influence policy,
with some activists insisting that 30% is the minimum threshold); Iturbe De Blanco,
supra note 186, at 691 (identifying an inability to add women’s issues to the
development agenda without a critical mass of support).
230
Shea & Christian, supra note 20, at 2049.
231
PAXTON & HUGHES, supra note 13, at 220; see also Haider-Markel, supra note
50, at 108 (citing scholars who make similar claims about backlash).
225
226
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structures may only select women who are unwilling to promote
women’s interests or may hinder women candidates from
promoting women’s interests. 232 Ultimately then, several authors
emphasize the need for legislators who are dedicated to
representing women—critical actors—rather than a critical mass.233
Gender quotas factor into the presence of critical actors. Since
quota women are elected partly because of their gender,
representing their female constituents becomes a necessary part of
their work. This “mandate effect” makes it so that female legislators
elected as a result of a quota are more likely than their male
counterparts to represent women’s issues.234
That said, quotas can also lead to a perception of female
legislators as being undeserving of their office. The mere presence
of a gender quota implies election due to gender rather than political
merit or popular support, thereby potentially causing further
marginalization by male legislators.235 Furthermore, quota women
might see little incentive to accurately represent their female
constituents, as they may find themselves in office again, regardless
of their performance in general elections. In this way, the presence
of a gender quota appears to contribute negatively to substantive
outcomes. Though Argentina’s quota made it easier to pass certain
types of women’s issue bills—as can be seen in the influx of rolebased, female-friendly provisions after the quota was
implemented—these bills were largely ineffective and have not been

232
See King, supra note 75, at 233-34 (discussing the gender quota system in
Uganda and arguing that “[t]he women that are selected by the predominantly
male Electoral College are usually chosen because they are not vigorous advocates
for women's rights or aggressive backers of gender equality. Thus, the female
representatives tend to be more passive individuals and loyal primarily to the
Electoral College.”); PAXTON & HUGHES, supra note 11, at 204 (discussing how, after
the election of a more conservative congressional leadership, Republican female
legislators shied away from focusing on women’s issues due to threat of intraparty
sanctions).
233 For a discussion on the value of having critical actors who are women
rather than a critical mass of women, see, for example, PAXTON & HUGHES, supra
note 13, at 221; SCHWINDT-BAYER, supra note 92, at 16; Shvedova, supra note 38, at 41.
234
SCHWINDT-BAYER, supra note 92, at 18.
235
See, e.g., Drude Dahlerup, Increasing Women’s Political Representation: New
Trends in Gender Quotas, in WOMEN IN PARLIAMENT: BEYOND NUMBERS 141, 143 (Julie
Ballington & Azza Karam eds., rev. ed. 2005); Franceschet & Piscopo, supra note 53,
at 402 (citing comparative literature that argues quotas may foster a belief that
certain “quota women” are undeserving of their office or underqualified for the
position).

Published by Penn Carey Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,

1076

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

[Vol. 43:4

executed in practice. 236 Effectively, the quota brought about
quantitative change, but qualitative change in terms of substantive
outcomes remains to be seen.
Second, the ability of a legislator to pass meaningful legislation
regarding a certain issue may have little to do with their willingness
to do so. Women have a much harder time turning their preferences
into legislation than their male counterparts.237 This is largely due to
the set of informal (and male-dominated) rules and norms which
make female legislators’ jobs even more difficult.238 This is only truer
where quotas are in effect, as men tend to see female legislators as
tokens rather than legitimate political colleagues, thereby
reinforcing male dominance and minimizing women’s power and
legitimacy.239 So, while the women are present, and while they may
intend to be critical actors for women’s interests, their male
colleagues may effectively prevent them from making any sort of
meaningful difference in the lives of their female constituents.
Marginalization of female legislators also comes as a result of
Argentina’s immensely strong party-system.240 In fact, much of the
reason why quota women have been ineffective in bringing about
substantive changes in the lives of Argentinean women is that
individual legislators hold relatively little power in the legislative
process. Party strength is further intensified by women who—in
Argentina’s case—tend to place a higher importance on party
loyalty than their male counterparts. 241 When parties do select a
female candidate, it is up to the party to determine the policy
preferences and legislative action of the legislator—regardless of
whether it is conducive to women’s socio-economic development.242
In Argentina, where female candidates are placed on party lists by
male party leaders, they are effectively tied to the platform of that

236
Bonder & Nari, supra note 210, at 191 (noting that women had to resort to
litigation achieve some level of compliance with the law); WOMEN’S ACTIVISM IN
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, supra note 117, at 159.
237
SCHWINDT-BAYER, supra note 92, at 21.
238
See Iturbe De Blanco, supra note 186, at 688, 690, 692 (offering insights into
how these rules and norms function as barriers); SCHWINDT-BAYER, supra note 92, at
21, 35 (“[M]arginalization of women by the male-dominated legislative
environment is a primary obstacle that female legislators face when trying to turn
their political preferences into legislative action.”).
239
SCHWINDT-BAYER, supra note 92, at 26; Galligan, supra note 46, at 328-29.
240
SCHWINDT-BAYER, supra note 92, at 37; Bonder & Nari, supra note 210, at 185.
241
SCHWINDT-BAYER, supra note 92, at 68.
242 Id. at 70.
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party and the demands of those leaders.243 As such, they tend to lack
the commitment to women’s issues necessary to produce
substantive outcomes. 244 According to some, the women who are
elected to political office undergo a change whereby they lose
interest in gender equality, thereby compromising their status as
women in exchange for acceptance into the legislature. 245
Ultimately, despite their high representation, few of the women in
Argentina’s legislature are committed to gender equality. 246 The
corresponding belief that these women are disconnected from
women’s interests shows that descriptive representation does not
guarantee substantive outcomes.247
Third, the quota system does not apply to leadership positions—
particularly those within committees and parties—which are often
extremely important to achieving substantive representation. 248
Committees are where bills are drafted and rules are written.
Therefore, having women represented is crucial, particularly on
stronger, more prestigious committees, rather than those focusing
on the “soft,” social issues, typically associated with women’s
politics.249 In Argentina, the president of the Chamber of Deputies
(the lower house of the national legislature) has the power to set the
legislative agenda and make committee appointments. But, as of
2021, there had not been a single female Chamber President.250 Even
the position of Vice President, which is much weaker and occupied
by three separate individuals at one time, has only been held by four
women in nearly 30 years. 251 Women are further relegated to
positions of weakness by being appointed exclusively to social issue
243
Bonder & Nari, supra note 210, at 192; María Del Carmen Feijoó, From
Family Ties to Political Action: Women’s Experiences in Argentina, in WOMEN AND
POLITICS WORLDWIDE 59, 68 (Barbara J. Nelson & Najma Chowdhury eds., 1994).
244
Bonder & Nari, supra note 210, at 193.
245
See WOMEN’S ACTIVISM IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, supra note
117, at 101 (noting that some female legislators are perceived to have abandoned
interest in gender issues once elected).
246
Gray, supra note 96, at 63.
247
Feijoó, supra note 243, at 68.
248
Azza Karam & Joni Lovenduski, Women in Parliament: Making a Difference,
in WOMEN IN PARLIAMENT: BEYOND NUMBERS 187, 195-97 (Julie Ballington & Azza
Karam eds., rev. ed. 2005) (highlighting the importance of women in leadership
positions for the advancement of women’s interests); see also Iturbe De Blanco, supra
note 186, at 690 (discussing the need to include women in the “inner circles of
decision-making” as a means of producing substantive outcomes).
249
Karam & Lovenduski, supra note 248, at 197; Tinker, supra note 46, at 14.
250
SCHWINDT-BAYER, supra note 92, at 107.
251 Id. at 108.
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committees. 252 So, while Argentina has a committee for women’s
issues (the Family, Women, Children, and Adolescents Committee),
which it has packed with female members and leaders, it is regarded
as lesser than most other legislative committees.253 Due to the lack of
support outside of social issue committees, female-friendly
legislation rarely makes it past the early stages of debate.254
The parties are also male dominated, with women holding very
few leadership positions. This has resulted in little effort on behalf
of the major political parties to support women’s issues. On the few
occasions that male party leaders have supported women’s issues, it
has been as a means to achieve their own political goals. 255 Even
before reaching the legislature, women’s political experience tends
not to include positions in the executive branch, which are more
prestigious than legislative positions and are crucial in terms of
establishing clientelism. 256 Moreover, Argentina has had few
women in ministerial positions—which are viewed similarly to
executive positions in terms of their prestige. 257 Without access to
these and other “elite political networks,” women are deprived of
the resources and status necessary to produce substantive change.258
In this way, the quota has been insufficient in transforming the
gendered power dynamics within Argentinean politics.259 Women’s
representation has grown over time, yet representation in positions
of power and leadership has not.
Fourth, female legislators can only effect change to the extent
provided by their legislative environment.
In the case of
Argentina—where broad party coalitions have fostered disunity
and conflict within the parties themselves—legislative output is
dismal.260 Moreover, the passage rate for bills dealing with women’s
252
Feijoó, supra note 243, at 64; Tinker, supra note 46, at 14 (noting that new
female legislators are relegated to less influential committee assignments).
253
SCHWINDT-BAYER, supra note 92, at 112.
254
See Franceschet, supra note 167, at 72–73 (noting that legislation introduced
by women is unlikely to receive consideration without support from party
leadership).
255
Feijoó, supra note 243, at 63.
256
Susan Franceschet & Jennifer M. Piscopo, Sustaining Gendered Practices?
Power, Parties, and Elite Political Networks in Argentina, 47 COMPAR. POL. STUD. 85, 86,
89-90 (2014).
257
Iturbe De Blanco, supra note 186, at 685-86; Franceschet & Piscopo, supra
note 256, at 90, 95.
258
Franceschet & Piscopo, supra note 256, at 86, 95.
259 Id. at 86, 95.
260
Piscopo, supra note 93, at 105–06.
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issues is even lower than that of other issues. 261 Argentina’s
relatively low passage rate comes also as a result of their weaker
executive branch. Whereas the Chilean executive has immense
control over the legislative process, in Argentina, that power is
concentrated within the legislative branch. 262 Furthermore, what
power the executive branch does hold has not been used to lobby
for female-friendly legislation, eliminating a key critical actor in the
fight for gender equality. 263 In the case of women’s sexual health
bills in Argentina, resistance from former-President Carlos Menem,
and later from former-President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner
stalled the passage and successful implementation of important
female-friendly legislation. 264 When a set of sexual health bills
finally passed, Argentina’s federal system effectively made it so that
implementation was out of the legislature’s hands.265 The presence
of a supportive executive can make up for a lack of support for
women’s issues within the legislature. In Argentina, its absence
exacerbates women’s legislative ineffectiveness.
Ultimately, descriptive representation does not contribute to
substantive outcomes as much as the presence of critical actors who
have the power to legislate on behalf of women’s interests. 266
Though they are present in much higher numbers than in Chile,
women in Argentina’s legislature lack meaningful influence over
the legislative process.267 This is primarily due to a lack of critical
actors, marginalization by a male-dominated legislative process and
a strong party system, exclusion from leadership positions, and an
ineffective legislative branch.

261 Franceschet & Piscopo, supra note 53, at 416 (“Although the Argentine
legislative process is such that bill failure is common, the success rates for
approving women’s rights bills is lower than average.”).
262
SCHWINDT-BAYER, supra note 92, at 87.
263
See Franceschet, supra note 167, at 75 (discussing how the absence of an ally
in the executive branch has served as an impediment to female legislators as they
attempt to pursue certain legislative initiatives).
264
Piscopo, supra note 93, at 111, 122.
265 Id. at 119.
266
SCHWINDT-BAYER, supra note 92, at 16.
267 Id. at 128.
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IV. CONCLUSION
While some find it inevitable that having higher descriptive
representation will produce greater substantive outcomes, this
Comment calls that relationship into question. The cases of Chile
and Argentina give a glimpse into the factors that affect the
descriptive-substantive link. By analyzing the political, social, and
cultural climates of these two countries and examining how they
factor into the given causal mechanism, I hope to have provided
greater insight into the realm of global gender politics. Legislative
marginalization, restrictive party platforms, exclusion from
leadership positions, unsupportive executives, and weak women’s
movements all actively prevent women from realizing their
legislative goals. Relative to men, women must overcome several
barriers in order to translate their political preferences and identities
into outcomes.
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